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"THE RIGHT TO WORK IMBROGLIO":
ANOTHER VIEW
LESLIE W. BAILEY, JR.*
DAN C. HELDMAN**
In an article, "The Right-to-Work Imbroglio", which appeared
in the North Dakota Law Review,' Professor James R. Eissinger
states some opinions concerning the current value to workers of
right to work laws. In the course of his article, Professor Eissinger
asks the following questions:
What continuing validity does the right-to-work issue have
against the background of a constantly evolving federal la-
bor legislation? More precisely, what rights accrue to a work-
ing person by passage of. a right-to-work law in addition to
those rights already assured by federal legislation? How
does a right-to-work law affect the overall scheme of federal
labor legislation?2
Professor Eissinger concludes that, although state right to work
laws may have been beneficial to the American worker in the forma-
tive stages of United States labor policy, fostered by the National
Labor Relations Act, such laws are no longer useful "[a]s an ad-
junct to the federal scheme of labor regulation . . . [and they now
add] very little of value to the panoply of protections accorded the
individual worker. ' ' 3 The authors of this article disagree with that
conclusion and with much of the reasoning employed by Professor
Eissinger.
The first section of this article will comment on and explain
disagreements with certain of Professor Eissinger's statements and
* Staff Attorney, National Right to 'Work Legal Defense Foundation; Member of the
Virginia Bar; B.A., 1965, University of North Carolina; J.D., 1973, Marshall-Wythe School
of Law, College of William and Mary.
** Studies Coordinator, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation; Assistant
Profess,,r of Politihal Sc iene and Cha iron ii of Comlparativye Studies Degree Program,
Texas Christian Ulnivernity; B.A., 1965, Southern llinois Univvrsity; M.A., 1966, Southern
Illinois [University.
1. BEssinger, The Right-to-Work Imbroglio, 51 N.D. L. REV. 571 (1975).
2. 1,. at 572.
3. 1d. at 594. Neither Professor Fissinger's article nor this article deals with the ques-
tion cof (7OipubiOl'yv flionism for public employees. For a comprehensive and scholarly
ti lotent of that subjict, sec Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public-Sector Bargaining,
10 WA E FOREST L. RE . 25 (1974).
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assertions in the. order in which they appear in his article. The sec-
ond and concluding section of this article will be devoted to a discus-
sion of why state right to work laws are valuable and necessary to
the implementation and protection of the right to work.
I. CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR EISSINGER'S ARTICLE
Professor Eissinger states that "political controversy has beset
the [right to work] movement since 1944 . . .",4 as if to imply there
is somehow something undesirable about such controversy. The Con-
stitution, however, shows the imprint of quite a contrary conviction
held by the Founding Fathers.5 This tolerance for dissent was
deemed essential by them for the government to remain effective,
yet responsive to the popular will.
Eissinger erroneously declares that this "controversy peaked
as a national issue in the decade of the fifties. . . ."0 He chose to
ignore the grassroots political protest that erupted nationwide in op-
position to the major effort in 19657 to repeal section 14(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, more commonly known as the Taft-
Hartley Act.,
A. EXPLODING SOME MYTHS ABOUT EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Professor Eissinger justifies certification of a union as exclu-
sive representative by pointing out that "[i]f a majority of employees
at the place of work do not see this advantage [of exclusive repre-
sentation], there is no organization and hence no exclusive bargain-
ing representative." 9 That statement, however, is not accurate. Much
less than a majority of the employees at a given place of work may
elect an exclusive representative, since the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has ruled that winning a representation election requires
only a majority of the number of persons actually voting, and not a
majority of the employees who are eligible to vote in the election.10
4. Eissinger, supra note 1, at 571.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the government for a redress of grievances.
6. Eissinger, sutpra note 1. at 571.
7. See L. EDVA.RDS, YOU CAN 'MAKE THE DirERENCE 75-92 (1968) ; Dirksen, Indiv{dual
Freedoimb Versus onipitlsorp U inn -vin: A Constit~tioo(l Problem, 1.5 DEPAUL L. REV. 259,
262 (1! 66). Miore re-ently, in 1976, retention of the Arkansais constitutional provision on
right to work \as ;I. bmtly contested ref,-renduo, item.
8. National Labor Relations Act § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited
as NLRA].
9. Eisslnger, supra note 1, at 583.
10. NLRB v. Whittier Mills Co., I1I F.2d 474, 477-78 (5th Cir. 1940) ; North Electric
Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 942, 942-43 (1967) ; East Ohio Gas Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1269, 1270 (1963)
RCA Mfg. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 159, 173-79 (1936).
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It is true, as Professor Eissinger points out," that if a certified
bargaining representative does not effectively do its job, it can be
decertified. 12 But, that option may be little consolation to workers
who are dissatisfied with the performance of the "bargaining repre-
sentative", since that option cannot ordinarily be exercised within
the one year period following a valid representation election, 3 nor
during the life of a collective bargaining contract. 14 Moreover, dis-
satisfied workers often lack the institutional and financial resources
possessed by an incumbent certified bargaining representative in
waging a decertification campaign.
While it is true that workers in a given bargaining unit may
revoke a union's authorization to execute collective bargaining con-
tracts with union security provisions, such de-authorization requires
the vote of at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in
such election, not just a majority of those actually voting. 15 Fur-
thermore, a de-authorization petition may not be filed more than
once per year.8
The following argument employed by opponents of right to work
urges that it is fair to compel financial support of an exclusive bar-
gaining representative by employees who did not vote for it in a
representation election:
It is only logical that employees benefiting as a result of the
bargaining agent's work should pay a! pro rata share of the
costs. To allow some employees to escape their financial ob-
ligation (be "free riders") by making membership voluntary
necessarily increases the financial burden of other employees.
Allowing "free riders" would be basically unfair.
7
A major defect in that argument is its assumption that employees
substantially benefit from the exclusive bargaining representative's
work.
Whether -an individual employee has reaped a net benefit from
efforts supposedly made on his behalf is a question that cannot be
answered without a careful examination of a complex array of fac-
tors, both subjective and objective. And, -it would seem that each
employee would be the best judge of whether he is personally bene-
fited.'8
11. Eissinger, .,spra note 1, at 584.
12. Dec-.'tificatin is aulthmriz'd by NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
13. Id. § X(a)(3), 29 U.S.('. § 158(a)(3) (1)70).
14. .Ne,' ' .iIotri~s, G. DOmLE, & J. SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 167-80 (1971).
15. NIAiA § 8a) (3). 29, '..C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
1i;. Id. 0 4e, 2) 29 U.S.)'. § 15 (.)(2) (1970). See, e.g., Monsanto Chemical Co., 147
N.L.I.B. 49 (1961).
17. Eissinger, st'r,1 n,)te 1, ;t 584.
18. ,c.' )l ICIYItl11 E. CHA.MBERLIN, P. BRADLEY, G. REILLY & R. POUND, LABOR UNIONS
AND PUBLIC P'OLICY, 47-91 (195S).
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Whether the employee has reaped a net benefit would necessitate
deciding in what order of priority a given employee would place such
interests as wage level, fringe benefits, working conditions, job secur-
ity, working hours, personal contact and relations with an employer,
opportunity for advancement, personal interest in and commitment
to quality and quantity in production, sense of personal worth, and
desire to avoid entangling associational commitments.
Granting officials of a single union the power to decide for all
the workers in a bargaining unit what interests will be promoted
seems to deny that adult human beings are capable of making basic
choices which determine not only their individual economic well-
being, but also the personal fulfillment derived from their jobs.
Why should employees be compelled to pay a pro rata share of
the costs of so-called benefits and services, which they may not want
or feel really benefit them, to a union they have not chosen or may
even have actively opposed? Furthermore, the assumption that the
employees in a collective bargaining unit enjoy even a net economic
benefit as a result of collective bargaining ignores the wage losses
and other tangible and intangible suffering which accompany long
strikes."
B. EXPENDITURES BY EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATIVES OF COMPELLED
DUES: A PRIOR RESTRAINT ON FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM?
The first amendment 20 -guarantees freedom from state interfer-
ence with the individual's right to think, speak, and write only his
own convictions concerning politics, religion, philosophy, economics,
or any other subject. It also guarantees that each individual may
support any lawful cause, political or otherwise, which he chooses
and that he may communicate his grievances to his government.
But, his right to refrain from these activities and withhold his sup-
port, whether financial or otherwise, is equally guaranteed by the
first amendment. 21
Since the National Labor Relations Act n-ow clothes unions cer-
tified as- exclusive bargaining representatives with power to contract
for compulsory dues and fees, 2 2 the forced collection of dues and fees
from rnon-union workers pursuant to union security established with
19. See S. PETo, THE KINGSPORT STRIKE (1967). To illustrate the financial loss caused the
individual worker by n strike, consider this example. Joe Doaks works in a factory, putting
in a 40-hour week. His union strikes in support of its demand that Joe's wages be increased
just 6% from $5.00 to $5.30 per hour. JEven if this strike lasts only 6 weeks, Joe will lose
$1,200.00 in wages whil-! manning the picket line. It will :be 100 weeks, just shy of 2
years, before Joe can break even, i.c., recoup the $1,200.00 wages lost during the strike,
and begin enjoying his $.30 per hour pay increase. Such wage losses are only partially and
temporarily offset by strike benefits.
20. U.S. CONSr. amend. 1, set forth at note 5 supra.
21. Good v. Associated Students of Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 94, 542 P.2d
762 (1975). See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
22. NLRA § 8(a)(3). 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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the aid of that power is a form of quasi-taxation. If union exclusive
"bargaining representatives" collect more money from non-members
than such non-members' pro rata share of the costs of negotiating
and administering collective bargaining agreements, these "repre-
sentatives" are exceeding their statutory authority.
Furthermore, if such excess funds are spent in support of politi-
cal candidates, for lobbying, in support of political or social causes,
or indeed for any non-bargaining purposes, it can be argued that
such expenditures constitute a prior restraint on the exercise of first
amendment freedom by those from whom the funds are extracted
under color Of contractual authority. This restraint occurs because
non-collective bargaining expenditures of compelled dues and fees
effectively force their true owners to support with these funds causes,
ideas, and persons which they have not chosen to support. Unwilling
donors may thereby face the sad spectacle of seeing their votes can-
celled by dollars forcibly extracted and spent in support of candi-
dates and issues which they oppose.
Professor Eissinger2 3 cites the Supreme Court's decision in
International Association of Machinists v. Street24 als adequate pro-
tection for the first amendment freedom of political expression. In
that case the Court held that monies which employees are compelled
to pay to an exclusive bargaining representative may not be spent
over their objections for political purposes.2 5
Eissinger questions where the line is to be drawn between union
activity acceptable for expenditure of compulsory agency fees, such
as costs of collective bargaining and grievance processing, and ac-
tivity which is not.2 6 The question might be asked why a worker
should even have to object in order to have the law protect his right
to refrain from subsidizing someone else's political activism. No
line would have to be drawn if unions were forbidden to exact com-
.pulsory fees from non-supporters.
Why should a private association have its salesmanship aided
by the force of federal law? Why not require unions to earn the sup-
port of their adherents just as other private associations and enter-
prises are required by law to do?
Exempting "majority" unions from having to continue to earn
employee support by services rendered gives them a monopoly power
of compulsion in the workshop and reduces the incentive to increase
efficiency,, effectiveness, or level of service. Such exemption gives
union officials power unequalled by that possessed by anyone, except
sovereign governments. This power and accompanying role of ex-
23. Elssinger, supra note 1, at 589-91.
24. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
25. Id. at 768-69.
26. Eissingcr, supra note 1, at 590.
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clusive representative is not likely to be used with equal regard for
the interests of all employees.27
Eissinger concludes that the question of which union expendi-
tures of compulsory fees aire appropriate and which are inappropri-
ate should be decided on a case-by-case basis, placing the burden of
proof on the individual workers to show after objections that par-
ticular expenditures were inappropriate.28 He argues that, by de-
ciding where to draw the line according to the circumstances of the
individual case, this, procedure "would allow some protection for the
individual, contingent upon his objection, and yet would permit the
union to carry out its objectives within the law. ' 129 Why shouldn't
the law be primarily concerned with the interests of the individual
worker, instead of lavishing so much attention upon the interests
of unions and their bosses?
Professor Eissinger indicates he believes it would be fair to hold
expenditure of compulsory dues for campaign contributions to politi-
cal candidates illegal and expenditure of such money for legislation
benefiting all members of the collective bargaining unit legal.3 0
Who is to decide what legislation benefits the individual employee?
A union official? An executive board? The employee himself?. An
argument that legally permissible expenditures of compelled dues
and fees should inclukle expenditures for universally beneficial legis-
lation ignores the real problem of how and by whom the lobbying
policy is to be determined: what types of legislation, if indeed any,
are universally beneficial?
Is it just or wise to deprive non-union members of the right to
determine for themselves what legislation would be in their own
best interest as workers? Who is better qualified than the individual
employee to make such a determination? If one argues that people
should not be entitled to determine for themselves what legislation
best benefits their interests on the job, could not one also argue that
27. "[T]he union is not neutral, but Is controlled by one employee group or another
from among the conflicting interests." Schatski, Majority Rule, Exclusivie Representation,
and the Interests of lidivdifal Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished? 123 U. PA. L.
Rsv. 897, 902 (1975). Schatski also states:
The almost universal fact that the union was opposed by a minority of the
employees who now must look to that organization for representation In
their Individual grievance proceedings compels one to come face to face with
a real novelty in our law, to which reference has already been made: An
individual Is forced to use a representative not of his or her own choosing
to settle an individual grievance or complaint. Indeed, the representative
may be antagonistic to the employee, either personally or ideologically.
Nevertheless, the law tells us that these individuals must be represented by
such unsympathetic institutions.
Id. at 904. In light of these sobering realities, Eissinger's concern with the criteria to
govern proper expenditures of compelled dues is misdirected. He should instead be con-
cerned about the injustice of forced payment to an unchosen and unsympathetic master.
28. Eissinger, supra note 1, at 590-91.
29. Id. at 591.
30. Id.
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people should have no vote, because they are not competent to de-
cide what governmental policies are in their best interest?
Consider also the argument that a person's right to vote i's fa-
.tally eroded if he can be required to support financially a union lobby
or campaign contribution which effectively cancels the intent of his
vote. For example, the power of my vote for candidate X is diluted
if a union forced upon me is contributing my money to candidate Y.31
C. "FREE RIDER", "FAIR SHARE": MYTHS AND GOBLINS?
It is occasionally conceded that individual workers do get some
benefit from right to work legislation. But, it is often argued that
this legislation confers its benefit at the expense of those workers
who choose to organize. Eissinger believes that this expense is the
greater pro rata share of collective bargaining costs that must be
borne by union members than their pro rata share of such costs if
everyone in the bargaining unit were forced to contribute to pay such
expenses 82
This argument, however, assumes too much. It assumes that all
persons who enjoy any incidental spin-off benefits from the private
associational activities of others have a moral responsibility to con-
tribute to paying the costs of those activities. It matters not that the
supposed gratuitous beneficiaries have not sought the alleged bene-
fits, that the alleged benefits, if any, may have no ascertainable
money value, and that, with respect to certain alleged beneficiaries
or in certain situations, such as prolonged strikes, there are in fact
no net benefits at all.
Suppose the impact of the exclusive representative's activities
is a net detriment to total worker welfare? In that event Should all
employees receive a pro rata reimbursement for losses occasioned
them by the violence and economic dislocation of prolonged strikes?
Persons who cry "free rider" assume the continued existence
of the "fair representation" doctrine.3 3 If that doctrine became de-
funct and unions were required to represent and process grievances
only for their members, then the share of costs assessed to each
31. See Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970). The court stated:
The diversion of the employ's' money from use for the purposes for which
it was exacted laniages them doubly. Its utilization to support candidates
and causes the plaintiffs oppose renders them captive to the ideas, associa-
tions, and causes espoused by others. At the same time it depletes their
own funds and resources to the extent of the expropriation and renders
them unable by these amounts to express their own convictions and their
own ideas amt to support their own causes.
Id. at 1004.
32. Eissinger, sup~ra note 1, at 593.
33. NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. 159 (1970) imposed upon the exclusive bargaining agent the
duty of granting representation to nfl the employees of the unit. The duty of fair repre-
sentation itself is a judicially created doctrine. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
member would be a true pro ration of the union's costs of doing busi-
ness in behalf of its voluntary members.
If every private association which claimed to confer gratuitous
benefits upon others were deemed to have the authority to tax all
persons arguably benefited, whether they have sought the benefits
or not, surely individual freedom would vanish.
It is inevitable in a free society, indeed a part of its price, that
some uncompensated spin-off benefits will accrue to society at large,
or even to identifiable portions thereof, as a result of many efforts
exerted by private individuals or groups in the productive exercise
of their freedoms of enterprise and association.3 4
D. EXPOSING FALLACIES IN THE "LABOR PEACE" ARGUMENT
Eissinger argues that right to work laws are an indirect threat
to the achievement of our national policy goal of industrial peace.3 5
Apparently, this argument is based on the assumption that voluntary
union members working in an open shop will so resent others exer-
cising their freedom not to join the union that the workshop at-
mosphere will be permeated by tension, irritation and resentment.
It is implied that such a workshop atmosphere is a breeding
ground for labor strife. However, it can also be argued that tense
atmospheres are caused largely by those persons who want to force
upon others their value judgments concerning pay, working condi-
tion's, and other job related interests.
An attempt is made to minimize the burdens of compulsory
unionism by asserting that, if a dissenting worker is required by law
to pay his so-called "fair share" of the expenses, "his fellow workers
do not care whether he is a member or not."' 36 That statement, how-
ever, just does not square with reality.3 7
Agency fee payers are not lawfully subject to strike discipline,
and union partisans are almost invariably threatened by the specters
of the diluted bargaining power and strike discipline, which they
feel will be caused by the exercise by non-member agency fee payers
of their right to continue working during a strike. Union partisans,
34. Churches, civic clubs, Red Cross, United Givers Fund, YM & WCA, etc. are
examples of other private associations that confer benefits on those from whom they have
no right to reimbursement.
35. Elsstnger, supra note 1, at 593.
36. Id.
37. Union activists care deeply when a fellow union member resigns and attempts to
return to work during a strike. This deep concern is shown by such resentful retaliation
as scab signs and harassment on the picket line, and by attempts to subject "defectors"
to such "union discipline" as trials, fines, or discharges. See NLRB v. Granite State
Joint Bd., 409 U.S. 213 (1972); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 388 U.S. 175 (1967)
Local Lodge No. 1994, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 215 N.L.R.B. 110 (1974).
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who have felt their collective power wielded through a strike was
being diluted by persons working during a strike, have therefore
resorted to obstructive and violent picket lines as an instrument
of coercion. 8
Eissinger concludes his article with several speculative statements.
The two most significant of these statements are: "[Tihe right-to-
work law adds very little of value to the panoply of protections ac-
corded the individual worker [by federal law]"; "' ° and (2) "[T]he
right-to-work movement has made contributions to the development
of American labor law, but its period of usefulness has been spent.
Section 14(b) which gave the movement life at the state level has
also served its purpose. '
40
The remainder of this article will be devoted to an exposition of
the indispensable contributions of right to work laws to the freedom
of the American worker.
II. CONTINUING VALUE AND NECESSITY OF STATE RIGHT TO
WORK LAWS.
A. RIGHT TO WORK: A DEFINITION
Before discussing the continuing value of state right to work laws,
it would be useful to sketch a profile of the right to work itself. Pro-
fessor Eissinger states that the term "right to work" is a "mis-
nomer" .4 1 He elaborates this argument by saying that, "These laws
do not and were never intended to guarantee a right to work or a
right to a job. 4'42
"Misnomer" is defined as "a use of a wrong name" or "a wrong
name or designation." 4 3 Therefore, unless the term right to work is
used in a context suggesting that it means a job guarantee or some-
thing else other than its dictionary meaning, it is incorrect to say
that the term right to work is a misnomer. If it is used only to refer
to the right to be employed without joining, paying or supporting
a union, then such use is not a misnomer.
The term also refers to the right to not have one's employment
terminated for failure to join or support a union. Right to work thus
has a clear, concise meaning within its own terms, remembering also
that it is a "slogan" with the same ellipsis problems as any other slo-
gan-"New Frontier", "Remember the Alamo", etc. and that no
slogan is meant to be taken absolutely literally.
The "right to work" is no more a misnomer than the "right of
38. S,"e . CAMPAIGNE, CHECK-OFF: LABOR BOSSES AND WORKING MEN 29-35 (1961).
: 1-'h. Ei iger, stpr nute 1, at 594.
410. Id. 594-95
41. Id. ot 573.
42. Id.
43. \WEB'STER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DCT~IONARY 735 (1974).
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free speech." The latter right does not guarantee an audience, and
in the same way, the right to work does not guarantee a- job.
Therefore, the term is not a misnomer when used to refer to
state statutes prohibiting union security arrangements. "Right-
to-work laws" have been defined as "any of various state laws ban-
ning the closed shop and the union shop. '"44
The right to work principle has been properly understood and
stated by the late Senate Minority Leader, Everett McKinley Dirk-
sen. 4 5 Senator Dirksen defined right to work as follows:
The right to work is not a guarantee of employment by a pa-
ternalistic system controlling all means of production. It only
signifies the inherent right of every man to an opportunity to
seek and retain the gainful employment which he deserves.
This is all that state Right to Work laws ever were intended
to preserve for the individual.
It is, of course, evident that compulsory unionism [whose
various forms purport to condition exercise of the Right to
Work upon some form of support to a certified union] is an
abnormal departure among private associations. No other or-
ganizations, not even churches, have the right to conscript
members. So, the public asks, why should unions? If a man
can be compelled to join a union or contribute to its financial
suppport, what other private organization may conscript mem-
bers, or in effect levy taxes on the privileges of citizenship? 4
B. THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
Of what practical value are such right to work laws to the indi-
vidual worker in protecting his right to work and earn his livelihood?
This question may be answered by describing how a right to work
law substantively protects an employee's freedom to choose concern-
ing the terms and conditions of his employment. Such protection is
not effectively provided by federal law. The answer will be com-
pleted by describing how state right to work laws rectify certain
inequities in the procedures and remedies provided by the National
Labor Relations Act.47
1. Substantive Protection.
Pursuant to section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act,8 an employer may agree with a labor organization, certified as
44. Id. at 998.
45. Dirksen, supra note 6, at 263.
46. Id. at 264.
47. NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
48. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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the bargaining representative of the employer's employees, to re-
quire as a condition of employment, that employees join the labor
organization on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of
such employment or on the effective date of the collective bargaining
agreement, whichever is later.49 Even though federal courts have
ruled that a collective agreement under this provision of the National
Labor Relations Act can require nothing more than financial support
of a union,5 0 such compelled support is a substantial imposition on
worker freedom, and is effectively blocked by state right to work
laws.
The protection given the individual worker from having to pay
financial tribute to a private association for the exercise of his right
to earn a living is indeed a valuable and distinctive feature of state
right to work laws.
In states without right to work laws labor organizations may sub-
ject workers to a burdensome exaction of monthly dues and initia-
tion fees for supposed benefits, which are often non-existent, un-
sought, and undesired. Agency fees or dues, and especially initiation
fees, can heavily burden such part-time workers as college students
who are trying to supplement an inadequate income in order to earn
their way through school. Unless he has specifically and individually
contracted to do so, as in the case of a placement service, no person
should have to pay a private association in order to enjoy the fruits
of his labor. In those right to work states where laws prohibit the
agency shop, this situation cannot occur.
State right to work laws provide valuable protection to laymen
who, unlearned in the niceties of labor law, are easy prey to union
organizers. These union organizers often deceive the worker by claim-
ing or implying in overly aggressive recruiting tactics that a union
security clause requires formal union membership to avoid discharge.
49. This requirement may be imposed only:
(i) if such labor organization is the repros-ntative of the employees as pro-
vided in section 159(a) of this title . . . and (ii) unless following an election
held as provided in section 159(e) of this title within one year. preceding the
effective date of such agreement, the Board shill have certified that at least
a majority of the emlfloyees eligible to vote in such election have voted to
rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agree-
ment ...
Id. It has been held, however. that a labor organization may not require the discharge of
an employee, who has refused to obey a collective bargaining contr'actual provision re-
quiring him to join the union wvithin 30 days, as long as such employee continues to pay
the periodlic dues and initiation fees unif flu I y irquired us a coindition o1 a tu iring or
retaining membership. See, e.g., Union Starch & Refining Co., 87 N.L.1. 779 (194)),
enforced, iS6 F.2d 1008 i7th Cir. 1951), ecrI. deni.i d, 342 U.S. 815 (151). This sole type
of membhership required as a condition of employment has becn described by the United
States Supre l Court as "financial core" membership. NLRI3 v. Gencral Motors Colp., 373
U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
The -National Labor Relations Act doos not cover farm workers or lublic em-
ployees. NLRA § 2(2), (3). 29 U.SC. . 152(2), (3) (1970).
50. See cases cited in note 49 supra. See Haggard, A Clari/iration of the Types of
Unioa Security Agrccments Affirmatively Permitted by Federal Statitcs, 5 RtrT.-CA.i. L.J.
418 (1974).
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Professor George Schatski has well described the susceptibility of the
lay worker to being misled to believe that a union security clause
requires him to join the union if he wants to keep his job:
It is true that sophisticated lawyers know that employees do
not have to become real members in order to retain their jobs
in shops which have union security clauses: all the employees
need do is tender dues and fees uniformly required of all union
members. However, the statute does not read quite so clearly,
and it would not be surprising for employees, most of whom
have never read the law, to believe that they must join the
union in order to keep their jobs. Moreover, many employees
are going to feel intimidated into joining the union in order to
avoid having the union prejudiced against them when it comes
to questions of their work status.51
Where a worker is protected by a comprehensive right to work
law, he can rest assured that to keep his job he need pay no homage
to a union, either by joining or by suffering a raid on his wallet. In
such an atmosphere of workshop freedom, his lay ignorance of the
fine distinctions between various union security arrangements has
no coercive consequences on the free exercise of his right to work.
One of the greatest benefits to the individual worker of right to
work laws is that they provide much more protection for his right
of free association than is provided by federal law.52 In Railway Em-
ployees Dep't v. Hanson,5 3 the Supreme Court held that it is within
the power of Congress under the commerce clause to authorize col-
lective bargaining contracts between employers and labor organiza-
tions which establish a union shop.54
International Association of Machinists v. Street" provided very
little protection for the worker's first amendment associational right
not to have his compelled union dues or fees spent for ideological
or political causes, with which he does not agree. In Street, the Court
held that Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act,58 intended to
authorize union shops, but did not intend that unions, pursuant to
union shops authorized by that Act, have the power to use funds gen-
erated by compulsory dues or fees to support political causes op-
posed by employees over their objections. 57
51. Schatski, supra note 27, at 914.
52. This right is guaranteed to him by the first amendment. See NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
53. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
54. Id. at 238. The Court reasoned that this authorization promulgated In the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970), does not violate the first or fifth amendments, be-
cause as a practical matter under such a union shop provision, employees are required
only to pay dues and initiation fees in order to keep their jobs. Id. at 238.
55. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
56. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-162 (1970).
57. 867 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961).
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The Street decision offers little encouragement to the individual
worker who wishes to avoid having his forced payments spent by the
union in any way it sees fit for political and ideological causes with
which he is not in sympathy. Street places the burden upon an em-
ployee to object to union expenditures, and to show that they are im-
permissible. 58 Even if a worker successfully makes this showing, he
must still go through the time-consuming and tortuous process of get-
ting the union to give him a rebate and proportionately reduce his
monthly dues. 59
A right to work law, which forbids any compelled payments to a
union as a condition of getting or keeping a job, would appear ef-
fectively to protect the individual worker from being taxed by pri-
vate associations who are prone to engage in massive political ac-
tivities with the aid of his involuntary subsidy.
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2. Procedural Protection.
Right to work laws not only provide invaluable substantive pro-
tection to the right to work, they also provide more reliable and ef-
fective sanctions against union infringement of this right than is pro-
vided by the unfair labor practice procedure promulgated by section
10 of the National Labor Relations Act,6 1 and by the procedure pro-
vided by that Act for filing a de-authorization petition.
62
Since right to work laws prohibit the union and employer from
conditioning employment on compulsory support of a union, the indi-
vidual worker need not be concerned whether he can muster the vote
of a majority of all eligible employees in his bargaining unit. His
freedom of association is guaranteed by state constitutional provision
or statute. Union compulsion is better forbidden by law than battled
in the workshop with the dice loaded against the individual worker
after union security is entrenched.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of a state right to work law over
the National Labor Relations Act is that a worker in a right to work
state may be fairly certain of redressing the harm done to him by a
violation of a right to work law, since he may usually file a lawsuit
and collect damages for injury done him by the violation.6 3 A worker
whose rights are injured by conduct that is arguably an unfair labor
58. Id. at 774.
59. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963).
60. Dirksen, supra note 7, at 266-67.
61. NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
62. Id. § S(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970); id. § 9(e) (1), 29 U.S.C. 159(e) (1)
(1970). As previously noted, employees may rescind the authority of labor organizations to
contract for union security provisions by winning de-authorization elections. NLRA §
5(a) (3) (ii), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (ii) (1970).
63. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26 § 375(6) (1958); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-46.8 (1962); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-34-13 (1974) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-63 (1970).
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practice, pursuant to section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act,"
has no assurance that his grievance will be redressed.
It has been held that the General Counsel for the National Labor
Relations Board has non-reviewable discretion to issue or to refuse
to issue a complaint,65 based upon charges filed by a worker who
feels he has been wronged. The charging party, therefore, -is at the
mercy of the General Counsel on whether he will ever have a hearing
on his claim that his rights have been violated by an unfair labor
practice.
The General Counsel may decline to issue a complaint for any
reason, budgetary, political, or otherwise, or for no reason at all.66
It seems settled that the charging party has no right to judicial re-
view of such a decision, for courts have generally ruled that he does
not.67 A worker seeking redress for a violation of a right to work law
need not rely on the conscience of a single man for justice. Under
right to work statutes, and the common law, an injured party gen-
erally enjoys, the protection of appellate review, 68 should a trial judge
arbitrarily dismiss a meritorious suit for violation of his right to
work, or commit other prejudicial error.
Right to work laws presently exist in at least twenty states,6 9
and they are ably serving the individual worker as a bulwark against
invasion of his right to earn a living by self-serving private associa-
tions who seem to have little concern for the impact of that ambition
on the individual working American.
64. NLRA § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
65. Hourihan v. NLRB, 201 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967).
66. NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970) ; Wellington Mill Div. 'West Point Mfg. Co.
V. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964). See cases cited
in Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214, 214-15 (1st Cir. 1972).
67. E.g., United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967); Sokolowski v. Swift & Co., 286 F. Supp. 775 (D. Minn.
1968).
68. Cf. Ludwig v. Armour & Co., - Iowa- , 159 N.W.2d 646 (1968) ; Sand v. Queen
City Packing Co., 108 N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1961) ; Machinists Local 924 v. Goff-McNair Motor
Co., 223 Ark. 30, 264 S.W.2d 48 (1954).
69. ALA. CODE tit. 26 § 375 (1968): AEiz. CONST. art. 25: ARrz. REV. STAT. §§ 23-1301
to 1307 (1971) ; ARK. CONST. amend. 34 : ARK. STAT. ANN. 33 81-210 to 217 (1976) ; FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 6; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-901 to 908 (1974) IOWA, CODE ANN. §§ 736A.I.
to A.8 (Supp. 1976) ; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 12 LA. REV. STAT. §. 981-987 (Supp. 1977)
Miss. CoNST. art. 7, § 198-A; MISS. CODE ANN. 3 71-1-47 (1973) ; NEB. CONST. art. 15, §§
13-15 ; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-217 to 219 (1974) ; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.230 to .300 (1974)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to 83 (1975) ; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 23; N.D. CENT. CODE
34-01-14 (1972) ; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-46 to 46.8 (1962) ; S.D. CoNST. art. 6, § 2; TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 50-208 to 212 (1966) ; TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5154g, 5207a (Ver-
non 1971) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-34-1 to 16 (1974) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-58 to 69
(1976) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-245.1 to 245.8 (1967).
